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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
SECURITIES LAW-STOCK UNDER THE DEFINITION OF SECURI-
TIES-ADOPTION OF A REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION THAT STOCK USED
TO ACQUIRE GREATER THAN FIFTY PERCENT INTEREST IN A CORPO-
RATION IS NOT A SECURITY AS DEFINED BY THE SECURITIES ACTS.
Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1982). The seventy percent
shareholder of Happy Radio, Inc.1 sued the sellers of Bret Broadcasting
Corporation, alleging that the defendants overstated the corporation's
earnings which induced Happy Radio's purchase of one hundred per-
cent of Bret Broadcasting's stock and the plaintiffs purchase of a con-
trolling interest in Happy Radio at inflated prices.2 The plaintiff
alleged that the misrepresentation of corporate earnings violated the
federal securities laws.3 The defendant moved to dismiss the federal
claims, asserting that neither the plaintiffs purchase of seventy percent
of Happy Radio stock nor Happy Radio's acquisition of one hundred
percent of Bret Broadcasting stock involved the purchase of a security.'
1. Happy Radio was the acquiring corporation. Aside from capital contributed by its share-
holders, Happy Radio, Inc.'s only asset was a contract for the purchase of the stock of Bret Broad-
casting from the defendants. Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197, 198 (7th Cir. 1982). The defendant
challenged the plaintiff's standing under rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1982), because his
purchase of Happy Radio occurred after Happy Radio entered the agreement with the defendants.
The court left this issue as well as a determination of whether the plaintiff's action should have
been brought derivatively for the district court to consider on remand. Id. at 203-04.
2. 687 F.2d at 198.
3. Count I of the complaint alleged that the defendants violated rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (1982), which prohibits the use of manipulative and deceptive devices "in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security." 687 F.2d at 199. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). See
also The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976) [hereinafter referred to as Securities
Act]; The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976) [hereinafter referred to
as Exchange Act]. "Securities Acts" is used throughout to refer to both Acts generally. See gener-
all/ Corporation of Foreign Bondholders Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77bb-77mm (1976); Trust
Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1976); Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15
U.S C. §§ 80b-I to -21 (1976); Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1976);
Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78111 (1976).
Count II alleged that the defendants violated state tort law. The plaintiffs brought this count
under the doctrine of pendant jurisdiction. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715
(1966). 687 F.2d at 199. For a discussion of state securities laws, see infra notes 14-15.
4. 687 F.2d at 199. See supra note 3 and infra notes 19-27, 30-53 and accompanying text.
The Securities Act of 1933 defines a security as follows:
When used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires-
(1) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evi-
dence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agree-
ment, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable
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The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint.' Vacating the dis-
trict court's dismissal,6 the Seventh Circuit held: the sale of business
doctrine7 applies to determine whether the transfer of one hundred per-
share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security,
fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in general, any inter-
est or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1976).
Similarly, section 3 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides,
When used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires-
(10) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas,
or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certifi-
cate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, cer-
tificate of deposit, for a security, or in general, any instrument commonly known as a
"security"; or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certifi-
cate for, receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing;
but shall not include currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance
which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of
days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1976).
The courts have construed these provisions, despite their dissimilarity, as equivalents. See, e.g.,
United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847 n.12 (1975); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389
U.S. 332, 336, 342 (1967); Coffin v. Polishing Machs., Inc., 596 F.2d 1202, 1204 (4th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979); United Cal. Bank v. THC Fin. Corp., 557 F.2d 1351, 1356 (9th
Cir. 1977); Miffin Energy Sources, Inc. v. Brooks, 501 F. Supp. 334, 335 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Hannan
& Thomas, The Importance of Economic Reality and Risk in Defining Federal Securities, 25 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 219, 221-23 n.13 (1974).
See also Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79b(a)(16) (1976); Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(36) (1976); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15
U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(18) (1976); The Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 77ccc(l) (1976); ALl
FED. SEC. CODE § 201(a) (1980).
5. The circuit court was uncertain about the extent of the trial court's dismissal and issued
an order asking for clarification. Only Count I was dismissed and certified for appeal. 687 F.2d at
199.
6. Id. at 204.
7. The "sale of business" doctrine is a particularized application of the economic realities
approach under the Howey test. See infra notes 11-34 and accompanying text. The doctrine's first
appearance, in Chandler v. Kew, Inc., 691 F.2d 443 (10th Cir. 1977), consisted solely of a con-
clusory statement that "[t]he economic realities of the case at bar show that the plaintiff was buy-
ing a liquor store and, incidentally as an indicia of ownership, was receiving 100% of the stock of
the company which owned the store." Id. at 96,054. The only authority cited for this position was
United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975). Id. For a discussion of the Supreme
Court's analysis in Forman, see infra notes 18-27 and accompanying text. The number of cases
adopting the "sale of business" doctrine has grown steadily. See Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 210
(7th Cir. 1982); Canfield v. Rapp & Son, Inc., 654 F.2d 459 (7th Cir. 1981); Frederiksen v.
Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3006 (1981); Reprosystem v. SCM
Corp., 522 F. Supp. 1257 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Golden v. Garafalo, 521 F. Supp. 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1981),
rev'd 678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982); Zilker v. Klien, 510 F. Supp. 1070 (N.D. I11. 1981); Anchor-
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cent of a corporation's stock constitutes a transaction in securities cov-
ered by the federal securities laws.8  Furthermore, a rebuttable
presumption arises that stock is acquired for other than an investment
purpose when greater than fifty percent of a corporation's stock is
purchased.9
The Supreme Court on several occasions has attempted to define the
limits of the terms constituting securities in the federal securities laws.'"
In SEC v. W.J Howey Co.,"I the Court first articulated a definition of
the term "investment contract"' 2 found in the Securities Acts.' 3 Exam-
ining the state court interpretations of the term, as used in blue sky
laws, 4 and the legislative intent of the Securities Acts, 5 the Court held
Darling Indus., Inc. v. Suozzo, 510 F. Supp. 659 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Barsy v. Verin, 508 F. Supp. 952
(N.D. Ill. 1981); Dueker v. Turner, [1979-80 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,386
(N.D. Ga. 1979); Bula v. Mansfield, 1979 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,964 (D. Colo. 1977). See
also Seldin, When Stock Is Not a Security: The "Sale of Business" Doctrine under the Federal
Securities Laws, 37 Bus. LAw. 637, 642-62 (1982); Thompson, The Shrinking Definition of a Secur-
itj:" VAy Purchasing.Alofa Company's Stock Is Not a Federal Security Transaction, 57 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 225, 236-52 (1982). See infra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
8. 687 F.2d at 202. See infra notes 30-34 & 42 and accompanying text.
9. 687 F.2d at 203. See infra notes 43, 50-53 and accompanying text. The court remanded
the case to the district court to afford the plaintiff an opportunity to demonstrate that he, in fact,
had an investment purpose. Id.
10. See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 102 S. Ct. 1220 (1982); International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
Danels, 439 U.S. 551 (1979); United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975); Tcher-
epnm v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967); SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967);
SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293
(1946); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
11. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
12. Specifically, the issue before the Court in Howe, was whether an interest in a citrus grove
resulting from a transaction involving a land sales contract, a warranty deed, and a service con-
tract was an "investment contract" and, therefore, a security subject to registration, see 15 U.S.C.
§ 77e (1976), under The Securities Act. 328 U.S. at 297. An earlier Supreme Court decision ad-
dressed the definition of security under the Securities Act as well. See SEC v. C.M. Joiner Corp.,
320 U.S. 344 (1943) (assignments of oil leases are securities). See infra notes 14 & 15 and accom-
panying text.
13. See supra note 4.
14. 328 U.S. at 298. The Court stated:
The term "investment contract" is undefined by the Securities Act or by relevant legisla-
tive reports. But the term was common in many state "blue sky" laws in existence prior
to adoption of the federal statute and, although the term was also undefined by state
laws, it had been broadly construed by state courts so as to afford the investing public a
full measure of protection. Form was disregarded for substance and emphasis was
placed on economic reality. An investment contract thus came to mean a contract or
scheme for "the placing of capital or laying out of money in a way intended to secure
income or profit from its employment."
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 56, 177 N.W.
937, 938 (1920)). Interestingly, the certificate that was found to be a security in Gopher Tire
Washington University Open Scholarship
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that an investment contract is an "investment of money in a common
enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others."
16
Adopting the expansive reading of the catch-all language of the defi-
nitions articulated in Howey, the Court in subsequent decisions broad-
ened the applicability of the federal securities laws to encompass
unconventional investment schemes. 7 In United Housing Foundation,
required the investors to participate in the enterprise. 146 Minn. at 54, 177 N.W. at 937. See
Long, An Attempt to Return "Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream of Securities Regulation, 24
OKLA. L. REV. 135, 146-47 (1971). See also infra note 38.
15. 328 U.S. at 298-99. The Court found that Congress, in including investment contract in
the § 2(1) definition of security, looked to the state court decisions that had "crystallized" its
meaning. Id. at 298. This crystallized definition, the Court stated,
permits the fulfillment of the statutory purpose of compelling full and fair disclosure
relative to the issuance of "the many types of instruments that in our commercial world
fall within the ordinary concept of a security.". . . It embodies a flexible rather than a
static principle, one that is capable of adaption to meet the countless and variable
schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on the promise of
profits.
Id. at 299 (citation omitted), quoting H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933), reprinted in
2 J. ELLENBERGER & E. MAHAR, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECUR-
mEs EXCHANGE AcT OF 1934 item 18, at 11 (1973).
16. 328 U.S. at 301. The Court elaborated, "The statutory policy of affording broad protec-
tion to investors is not to be thwarted by unrealistic and irrelevant formulae." Id, quoted in
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 338 (1967).
The Howey test purports to examine the economic characteristics of the interest and, as a result,
is frequently referred to as the economic realities test. Even when limited to defining investment
contracts the Howey test has not been without its detractors. For example, in a leading article
Professor Joseph Long wrote:
Justice Murphy was in error when he claimed to be restating a definition which had
received universal acceptance by prior cases and the effect of the Howey case was to
perpetuate a test which was misleading and did not accurately reflect the policy behind
securities regulation. What makes the Howey test even more tragic is the ill-chosen lan-
guage used to frame the test and the fact that the test is totally unnecessary to the disposi-
tion of the case.
Long, supra note 14, at 177.
17. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967); SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387
U.S. 202 (1967); SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
Prior to Forman the Court used the Howey test expansively so as to afford a federal remedy
when none would otherwise be available. See, e.g., 389 U.S. at 338. The focus of the test inexpli-
cably changed in Tcherepnin: "[I]n searching for the meaning and scope of the word 'security' in
the Act, form should be disregarded for substance and the emphasis should be on economic real-
ity." Id. at 336 (citing 328 U.S. at 298) (emphasis added). The Court's use of the economic reali-
ties approach in Howey, however, only applied to investment contracts. See 328 U.S. at 298-301.
Indeed, Howey acknowledged that "investment contract" and "any interest or instrument com-
monly known as a 'security'" were terms that required a treatment different from that to be given
the other interests enumerated in the statutes. Id. at 297.
The Court in Forman, however, adopted Tcherepnin's imprecise paraphrase of Howey and held
that the economic realities test applies to the definition of "security" in general. 421 U.S. at 848.
Thus, no reason has ever been given for applying this phrase to securities as a generic term includ-
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Inc. v. Forman,8 the Court looked to the Howey decision for guidance
in determining whether an interest in a cooperative housing project la-
belled "stock" constituted a security.19 The Court held that, despite the
specific mention of the term "stock," the interest did not fall within the
meaning of security under federal law, for two reasons.2u
First, while admitting that Congress intended a broad gloss to be
placed on the definition of security,21 Justice Powell, writing for the
majority, rejected a literal interpretation of section 2(1) of the Securities
Act and refused to find that the definitions encompass "any .. .
stock."22 Instead, the Court reasoned that the parties' interest in the
cooperative housing project did not possess any of the characteristics
typically attributed to stock: The right (1) to receive dividends contin-
gent upon an apportionment of profits, (2) to alienate the stock freely,
(3) to pledge or hypothecate the interest, (4) to vote on corporate mat-
ters in proportion to the number of shares owned, (5) to share in the
appreciation of the underlying assets.23
ing "stock." Yet, several lower courts have readily used the Howey test to narrow the definition of
"security." See, e.g., Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147, 1151 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 101
S. Ct. 3006 (1981); infra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
18. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
19. See id. at 842, 848.
20. Id. at 859-60. See supra note 4; infra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
21. 421 U.S. at 847-48. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) ("[W]e are
guided by the familiar canon of statutory construction that remedial legislation should be con-
strued broadly to effectuate its purposes."); SEC v. Capital Gains Res. Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180,
195 (1963) (federal securities legislation should not be construed "technically and restrictively, but
flexibly to effectuate its remedial purpose."). See also Titsch Printing, Inc. v. Hastings, 456 F.
Supp. 445, 449 (D. Colo. 1978). See generally Long, supra note 14, at 135.
22. 421 U.S. at 848.
23. Id. at 85 1.
In holding that the name given to an instrument is not dispositive, we do not suggest
that the name is wholly irrelevant to the decision whether it is a security. There may be
occasions when the use of a traditional name such as "stocks" or "bonds" will lead to
purchaser justifiably to assume that the federal securities laws apply. This would clearly
be the case when the underlying transaction embodies some of the signiqfcant characteristics
typically associated with the named inftrument.
Id. (emphasis added). See Seagrave Corp. v. Vista Resources, Inc., 696 F.2d 227, 230 (2d Cir.
1982); Mifflin Energy Sources, Inc. v. Brooks, 501 F. Supp. 334, 335 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Titsch
Printing Inc. v. Hastings, 456 F. Supp. 445, 447-48 (D. Colo. 1978); Bronstein v. Bronstein, 407 F.
Supp. 925, 928-29 (E.D. Pa. 1976). See infra notes 37-40, 56-57 and accompanying text. Because
the common characteristics test requires inquiry beyond labels it is a more rigorous test than that
which looks no further than the face of the definition.
Several lower courts have expressly rejected the common characteristics test before applying the
Howey test. See Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3006
(1981); Anchor-Darling Indus., Inc. v. Suozzo, 510 F. Supp. 659 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Ducker v. Tur-
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Second, the Court applied the Howey test to the interest in the coop-
erative housing project.24 The Court found that the promise of inex-
pensive housing rather than the hope of investment returns motivated
the buyers in purchasing the interest.25 Therefore, the "economic reali-
ties" of the transaction did not involve an investment purpose, and the
ner, [1979-80 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,386 (N.D. Ga. 1979); Bula v. Mans-
field, 1979 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,964 (D. Colo. 1977).
Apparently, these courts would apply the common characteristics tests if the party can show
that his reliance on such characteristics induced him to enter the transaction. See, e.g., 510 F.
Supp. at 666 quoting McAneny, Acquisition of Businesses Through Purchases of Corporate Stock:
An Argumentfor Exclusion From Federal Securities Regulation, 8 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 295, 316
(1980). The theory that reliance on common characteristics might constitute an exception when
the Howey test, see supra note 16 and accompanying text, otherwise would be applied derivates
from the statement in Forman that "[t]here may be occasions when the use of a traditional name
such as 'stocks' or 'bonds' will lead a purchaser justifiably to assume that the federal securities
laws apply." 421 U.S. at 850. Because we are concerned, however, with transactions that involve
corporate stock, which comes within the literal meaning of the statute, the better argument would
be that the Securities Acts apply unless the common characteristics test is rebutted. But see Mc-
Aneny, supra at 316-17.
24. 421 U.S. at 851-85.
25. 421 U.S. at 851. The Court applied an economic realities test. See supra note 16. In
discussing the Howey test, the Supreme Court stated in Forman that,
By profits, the Court has meant either capital appreciation resulting from the develop-
ment of the initial investment ... or a participation in earnings resulting from the use of
investor's funds. . . . In such cases the investor is "attracted solely by the prospects of a
return" on his investment .... By contrast, when a purchaser is motivated by a desire
to use or consume the item purchased.., the securities laws do not apply.
421 U.S. at 852-53. This investment/commercial or investor/entrepreneur dichotomy first ap-
peared in cases inquiring into the Securities Act's applicability to promissory notes. See, e.g.,
Baurer v. The Planning Group, Inc., [1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,365
(D.C.D.C. Dec. 4, 1981); Emisco Indus., Inc. v. Pro's Inc., 543 F.2d 38 (7th Cir. 1976); C.N.S.
Enters., Inc., v. G. & G. Enters., Inc., 508 F.2d 1354 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975);
Zabriski v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1974); McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490 (5th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975); Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank, 495 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir.
1974); Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463
F.2d 1075 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009 (1972); Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 452
F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1971). See also A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 119-25 (1939). But see Lehigh Valley Trust Co. v. Central Nat'l Bank, 409
F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1969). See generally Newton, What Is a Security?: A4 CriticalAnalysis, 48 Miss.
L.J. 167 (1977); Comment, Bank Loan Particivations as Securities: Notes, Investment Contracts,
and the Commercial/Investment Dichotomy, 15 DUQ. L. REv. 261 (1977); Comment, Commercial
Notes and Definition of "Security" Under Securities Exchange Act of 1934: A Note Is a Note Is a
Note, 52 NEB. L. REv. 478 (1973). This standard clearly benefitted from the exclusion under The
Exchange Act of "any note, draft, bill of exchange, or bankers' acceptance which has a maturity at
the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months," 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1976), and the similar
exclusion under the Securities Act of "[a]ny note, draft, bill of exchange, or bankers' acceptance
which arises out of a current transaction or the proceeds of which have been or are to be used for
current transactions, and which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine
months," 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(3) (1976). These instruments can be classified generically as commer-
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interest failed to pass the Howey test.26 The Court thus used Howey to
narrow the scope of the federal securities laws for the first time.27
The two-pronged test applied by the Court in Forman is frequently
invoked in cases involving the transfer of closely held corporations
28
cial paper--thus the distinction. No such exception, however, was provided for stock. The fol-
lowing is typical of judicial statements setting forth the dichotomy:
[B]uying share of the common stock of a publicily-held corporation, where the impetus
for the transaction comes from the person with the money, is an investment; borrowing
money from a bank to finance the purchase of an automobile, where the impetus for the
transaction comes from the person who needs the money, is a loan.
508 F.2d at 1359. See 421 U.S. at 851-52. Corporate stock, even when 100% is acquired, does not
seem to depart from the first example. Indeed, in all purchases of corporate stock the buyer is
putting forth his assets in the hope of receiving a return--that is, making an investment.
26. 421 U.S. at 859-60.
27. See supra note 17. Subsequent cases have adhered to this generally restrictive treatment
of the Securities Acts. Compare Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 976 (1977); Santa Fe
Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976);
Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 423 U.S. 232 (1976); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66
(1975), Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975); United Hous. Found., Inc. v. For-
man, 421 U.S. 837 (1975) and Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1972) with
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1975); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers
Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971); SEC v. Capital Gaines Res. Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963)
and Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied 416
U.S. 960 (1974). But see Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983).
The Supreme Court has considered the definition of security twice since Forman. In Interna-
tional Bhd of Teamrters v. Daniel, the Court determined that a noncontributory, compulsory pen-
sion plan was not subject to federal securities laws as an investment contract. 439 U.S. 551, 556-
57, 570 (1979). More recently the Supreme Court in Marine Bank v. Weaver, held that a certificate
of deposit is not a security. 102 S. Ct. 1220, 1225 (1982). It is somewhat unclear what standard the
Court applied in Marine Bank. Compare Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139, 1143 (2d Cir. 1982)
with Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197, 200 (7th Cir. 1982).
28. For cases concerning closely-held corporations, see infra notes 30 & 36. Two cases have
proposed that the sale of business doctrine should also extend to publicly-held corporations. See
Zilker v. Klein, 510 F. Supp. 1070 (N.D. IMI. 1981); Reprosystem v. SCM Corp., 522 F. Supp. 1257
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); see also Seagrave Corp. v. Vista Resources, Inc., 696 F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 1982)
(purchase of sizeable portion of a publicly traded corporation's assets by a closely held corpora-
tion subject to Securities Acts). Although the facts of Zilker indicate that the acquired corporation
had been closely-held, the plaintiff tried to distinguish Zilker from Frederiksen as applying only to
nonpublicly-held corporations. 510 F. Supp. at 1075. The court declared that this was an insuffi-
cient basis for distinguishing the cases. Id. Other bases, however, may exist. The sale of business
doctrine can effect a metamorphosis of an interest-that is, render it a security for one transaction
and not for another. For example, stock that is clearly a security in the hands of a seller would not
be a security in the hands of a purchaser who could exercise control over the corporation. See
infra note 52. The sale of business doctrine may be incompatible with other provisions, which
treat the stock of publicly held corporations as securities. For example, in a "going private" trans-
action, the stock purchased would not be a security; yet, the cases clearly hold that the minority
shareholders have a right of action under rule lOb-5. See, e.g., Healey v. Catalyst Recovery of Pa.,
Inc. 616 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1980) (minority shareholders have a cause of action under rule lOb-5
when a misrepresentation deprives the shareholder under state law of the opportunity to enjoin a
Washington University Open Scholarship
666 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 61:659
through the sale of stock.29 The weight of authority considering the
acquisition of a one-hundred percent interest in a corporation's stock
supports finding the Securities Acts inapplicable under the sale of busi-
merger); Alabama Farm Bureau Mutual Cas. Co., Inc. v. American Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 606
F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1979) (minority shareholders may bring a lob-5 action upon a showing that a
prima facie case exists when remedies were available under state law), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820
(1980); Kidwell ex rel. Penfold v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979) (minority shareholders,
though not entitled to vote on the transaction in question, may have a rule lob-5 cause of action);
Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977) (minority shareholders may bring a derivative
action under rule 10b-5), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978); Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 236
(7th Cir. 1977) (a rule lOb-5 action exists when a majority shareholder so dominates the board of
directors that only the minority shareholders can represent the corporation's interests), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978). One might try to distinguish a "going private" transaction from the
acquisition cases by arguing that in an acquisition the plaintiff would be the purchaser whose
intent is to control, whereas in the going private case the plaintiff would be the seller who holds
securities that met the Howey test in an earlier transaction. The definition of what is being sold,
however, should not depend on who the plaintiff is. The statutes do not draw such a distinction.
Compare McGrath v. Zenith Radio Corp., 651 F.2d 458 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 136
(1981) with Oakhill Cemetery of Hammond, Inc. v. Tri-State Bank, 513 F. Supp. 885 (N.D. 111.
1981).
A similar analysis applies to tender offers. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)-(e) (1976). The
Exchange Act protects security holders against the use of fraudulent practices in the solicitation of
their shares. Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1974). It is illogical that one
could offer to buy securities that are not securities.
Section 7 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78(g) (1976), which regulates margin transactions,
also contains the term "security." Regulations promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board govern
loans granted by banks or arranged by brokers with securities as collateral. See Reg. T, 12 C.F.R.
§ 220 (1982); Reg. U, 12 C.F.R. § 221 (1982). A number of cases have arisen in connection with
tender offer financing and margin requirements. E.g., Pargas, Inc. v. Empire Gas Corp., 423 F.
Supp. 199, 238-39 (D. Md.), af'd, 546 F.2d 25 (4th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); Alaska Interstate Co.
v. McMillan, 402 F. Supp. 532, 553-65 (D. Alaska 1975). Extension of the Howey test could
eliminate federal subject-matter jurisdiction in these cases. Consequently, a "thin corporation"
could make a tender offer, using the stock as collateral, without regard to disclosure requirements,
see 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), 78n(d) (1976 & Supp. V 1981), and justify the transaction under Zilker
as an acquisition of a business and not of securities.
The applicability of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78 m(d)-(C), 78 n(d)-(f) (1976 & Supp. V
1981), may also be jeopardized under the sale of business doctrine. The purpose of the Act is to
provide the public with information concerning shifts in control. It ought to apply, therefore,
regardless of the extent to which control shifts. The Williams Act, however, applies to "securi-
ties." If the sale of business doctrine applies, the Act's usefulness may be curtailed.
29. The leading case is Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S.
Ct. 3006 (1981). In Frederiksen the plaintiff purchased the assets and the stock of a corporation,
which operated a boat marina, from the defendant and contracted for the defendant's consulting
services for five years. Upon early termination of the employment agreement by the plaintiff, the
defendant brought suit in state court for breach of contract and for fraud. The plaintiff then sued
for fraud under the Securities Acts in federal court. Id. at 1148-49. The Seventh Circuit affirmed
the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's claim. Id. at 1154. In so holding the court empha-
sized that the Supreme Court had stated that the securities laws are inapplicable when the
purchase is not for the purpose of investment. Id. at 1150. Furthermore, without discussion, the
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ness doctrine.30 The sale of business doctrine requires a rejection of a
literal approach to defining security3 in favor of an analysis of the eco-
nomic realities of a particular transaction. 2 A transaction involving
one-hundred percent of a corporation's stock fails to meet the Forman
economic realities approach for two reasons. First, the transaction does
not involve an investment in a common enterprise under the Howey
analysis.33 Furthermore, when the buyer purchases 100% of the stock
he takes an active entrepreneurial role rather than a passive investment
court found that Forman expressly rejected a literal approach in favor of an economic realities
approach. Id. at 1150-51.
Several commentators have addressed the question of the status of stock under the definitions of
securities when the stock is used to acquire a corporation. McAneny, supra note 23; Schneider,
The Elusive Definition of "Security," 14 REv. SEC. REG. 981 (1981); Seldin, supra note 7; Thomp-
son, supra note 7; Comment, The Sale ofa Close Corporation Through a Stock Transfer: Covered
By The Federal Securities Laws, 11 SEroN HALL L. REV. 749 (1981). See generally Coffey, The
Economic Realities ofa "Security " Is There a More Meaningful Formula, 18 W. REs. L. REv. 367
(1967); Hannan & Thomas, The Importance of Economic Reality and Risk in DOtning Securities, 25
HASTINGS L A. 219 (1974); Long. upra note 14; Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under
The Federal Securities Laws: The Pendulum Swings, 65 GEO. LJ. 891 (1977); Comment, Bank
Loan Particpations as Secuitiem" Notes, Investment Contracts, and The Commerical/Investment
Dichotomy, 15 DuQ. L. REv. 261 (1976); Note, The Securities Exchange Act and he Rule of Exclu-
sive Federal Jurisdiction, 89 YALE .J. 95 (1979).
30. See Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1982); Canfield v. Rapp & Son, Inc., 654 F.2d
459 (7th Cir. 1981); Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3006
(1981); Chandler v. Kew, 691 F.2d 443 (10th Cir. 1977); Reprosystem v. SCM Corp., 522 F. Supp.
1257 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Golden v. Garafalo, 521 F. Supp. 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd 678 F.2d 1139
(2d CE. 1982); Zilker v. Klien, 510 F. Supp. 1070 (N.D. IM. 1981); Anchor-Darling Indus., Inc. v.
Suozzo, 510 F. Supp. 659 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Barsy v. Verin, 508 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. IlL 1981);
Dueker v. Turner [1979-1980] FED. SEC. L. RaP. (CCH) 97,386 (N.D. Ga. 1979); Bula v. Mans-
field. 1979 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,964 (D. Colo 1977). See also Tech Resources, Inc. v.
Estate of Hubbard, 246 Ga. 583, 272 S.E.2d 314 (1980). Cf. McGrath v. Zenith Radio Corp, 651
F.2d 458 (7th Cir.) (The Howey test can be met by either party to the transaction), cert. denied, 102
S. Ct. 136 (1981); Somogy v. Butler, 518 F. Supp. 970 (D. NJ. 1981) (no security present when the
plaintiff purchased the assets of a business, simultaneously incorporated the business, and there-
upon issued stock to himself); Oakhill Cemetery of Hammond, Inc. v. Tri-State Bank, 513 F.
Supp. 885 (N.D. IML 1981) (Howey test applied when the plaintiffwas neither the purchaser nor the
seller in the transaction on the theory that Frederiksen must result in the same treatment of the
interest for all parties). See also Ellis v. Henderson, 1980 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,722
(W.D. Okla. 1980); Chiodo v. General Waterworks Corp., 380 F.2d 860 (10th Cir.), cert. denied
389 U.S. 1004 (1976); Fox v. Ehrmantraut, 28 Cal. 3d 127, 615 P.2d 1383, 167 Cal. Rptr. 595
(1980).
31. Eg., Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147, 1150-51 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. CL
3006 (1981). See infra note 38.
32. See supra note 7.
33. The common enterprise requirement of the Howey test requires that there be two inves-
tors at a minimum. See Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139, 1142 (2d Cir. 1982); Hirk v. Agri-
Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 100-03 (7th Cir. 1977).
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role in which management would be left to others.34
Despite the trend towards exemption of closed corporation stock
sales from federal security law coverage,35 the Second Circuit has re-
cently rejected the sale of business doctrine. In Golden v. Garafalo,36
the court argued that the drafters of the definitions would not have
included specific types of instruments in the definition had they in-
tended for a significant proportion of the instruments to be excluded by
an economic realities test.37 The court reasoned that a literal approach,
on the other hand, comports with the legislative intent that the defini-
tion of security should include "the many types of instruments that in
our commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of security.' '38
34. The Howey test states that profits must come "solely from the efforts of others." 328 U.S.
at 299. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. This element of the test, however, has not
always been rigidly upheld. See, e-g., SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir.
1974); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973). See also supra note 25.
35. See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
36. 678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982).
37. 678 F.2d at 1144.
If an 'economic reality' test were intended, reference to such specific types of instru-
ments, and common variations of them, would have been inappropriate because a sub-
stantial portion of each class of instrument would, in fact, not be within the definition,
We believe that Congress intended to draft an expansive definition and to include with
specificity all instruments with characteristics agreed upon in the commercial world, such
as 'debentures,' 'stock,' 'treasury stock' or 'voting-trust certifications.' Catch-all phrases
such as 'investment contract,' were then included to cover unique instruments not easily
classified. If the 'economic reality' test were to be the core of the definition, only general
catch-all terms would have been used.
Id See Seagrave Corp. v. Vista Resources, Inc., 696 F.2d 227, 229-30 (2d Cir. 1982). See also
Daily v. Morgan, 701 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1983); Glick v. Campagna, 613 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1979);
Coffin v. Polishing Machs., Inc., 596 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979); Mifflin
Energy Sources v. Brooks, 501 F. Supp. 334 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Titsch Printing v. Hastings, 456 F.
Supp. 445 (D. Colo. 1978); Bronstein v. Bronstein, 407 F. Supp. 925 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
38. 678 F.2d at 1144. See H. REP. No. 45, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933). See also supra note
14 and accompanying text.
Although the language of a statute is the most important evidence in statutory construction, see
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 558 (1979), the context in which.the
language was drafted colors the literal meaning. See SEC v. C.M. Joiner Corp., 320 U.S. 344,
350-51 (1943). For the Securities Acts, the context was the speculation and fraud of the financial
world during the Roaring Twenties, and the depression they helped to create. H.R. REP. No. 85,
73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1933); H.R. Doc. No. 12, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1933), reprinted in 2 J.
ELLENBERGER & E. MAHAR, supra note 14, at Item 15, 1-2. The state "blue sky" laws and the
federal mail fraud laws had proved to be ineffective in thwarting securities fraud. H.R. REP. No.
85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1933). It was left to Congress to provide a solution.
Congress' intent to prevent and punish securities fraud is clearly indicated by The House Re-
port accompanying the Securities Act. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1933). This is
manifest in the disclosure and antifraud provisions. See L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1421-
28 (temp. st. ed. 1961). Numerous decisions have relied on this intent in broadly applying the
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Although the literal approach to interpreting the definition of security,
adopted by the Second Circuit, has not been widely accepted for sales
of 100% of a corporation's stock,39 a number of decisions involving the
sale of less than 100% of a corporation's stock have invoked a literal
approach.40
In Sutter v. Groen41 the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its application of
the sale of business doctrine to sales involving 100% of a corporation's
stock.42  Additionally, the court created a rebuttable presumption
against finding an investment purpose in the event of a sale involving
less than a 100% interest if the purchaser at the conclusion of the trans-
action holds more than 50% of the corporation's stock.43 Judge Posner,
writing for the court, found that although the Second Circuit in Golden
successfully distinguished the Supreme Court's Forman decision as in-
volving an instrument lacking the common characteristics of corporate
stock,44 a recent decision by the Supreme Court 45 conclusively reaf-
third provision of the Howe), test so as to exclude those who exercise control over the corporation
from the protection of the Securities Acts. See, e.g., United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421
U.S. 849 (1975); Anchor-Darling Indus., Inc. v. Suozzo, 510 F. Supp. 659, 662 (1981). The Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency, however, expressed a broader purpose in discussing the
defimtion of "security" that is consistent with the Supreme Court's pre-Forman decisions. See H.
REP. No. 45, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 11 (1933). From the Committee's report, it is clear that Congress
intended to "include. . . the many types of instruments that in our commercial world fall within
the ordinary concept of a security." Id.
39. Compare Canfield v. Rapp & Son, Inc., 654 F.2d 459 (7th Cir. 1981); Frederiksen v.
Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3006 (1981); Reprosystem v. SCM Corp.,
522 F. Supp. 1257 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Golden v. Garafalo, 521 F. Supp. 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd,
678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982); Zilker v. Klien, 510 F. Supp. 1070 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Anchor-Darling
Indus., Inc. v. Suozzo, 510 F. Supp. 659 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Barsy v. Verin, 508 F. Supp. 952 (N.D.
Il. 1981); Ducker v. Turner, [1979-80] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,386 (N.D. Ga. 1979) and
Bula v. Mansfield, 1979 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,964 (D. Colo. 1977) with Daily v. Morgan,
701 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1983); Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Pat Ryan & Assocs., Inc., 496 F.2d 1255
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1023 (1974) and Titsch Printing, Inc. v. Hastings, 456 F. Supp. 445
(D. Colo. 1978).
40. See, e.g., Coffin v. Polishing Machs., Inc., 596 F.2d 1202, 1204 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 868 (1979); Bronstein v. Bronstein, 407 F. Supp. 925, 928-29 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
41. 687 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1982).
42. Id. at 202. See Canfield v. Rapp & Son, Inc., 654 F.2d 459 (7th Cir. 1981); Frederiksen v.
Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3006 (1981). See also supra notes 7 & 29.
43. 687 F.2d at 203. "The presumption can be rebutted by showing that the purchaser's main
purpose was investment." Id. See supra notes 25 & 34. The court did not address the question of
what result should occur when only 50% is involved. 687 F.2d at 203.
44. 687 F.2d at 200. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
45. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 102 S. Ct. 1220 (1982).
Washington University Open Scholarship
670 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 61:659
firmed a rejection of a literal reading of the definitions.46 Judge Posner
emphasized that the purpose underlying the Securities Acts is to protect
investors47 rather than entrepreneurs. 4 Recognizing this purpose of the
statutes, the court applied the sale of business doctrine to the acquisi-
tion of 100% of the stock in Bret Broadcasting.49
Judge Posner found a closer question when the transaction involves
less than 100% of the stock. 0 The distinction between entrepreneurial
and investment purposes, however, remained paramount.51 A greater
than 50% interest in a corporation gives its owner control and com-
mands a premium.52 Accordingly, Judge Posner held that the purchaser
46. 687 F.2d at 201. This conclusion does not appear, however, to flow by necessity from
Marine Bank. See supra note 27.
47. 687 F.2d at 201. Judge Posner found support for this position in President Roosevelt's
recommendation to Congress that legislation "providing for the regulation by the Federal Gov-
ernment of the operations of exchanges dealing in securities and commodities for theprotection of
investors, for the safeguarding of values, and so far as it may be possible, for the elimination of
unnecessary, unwise, and destructive speculation" be enacted. Id quoting S. REP. No. 792, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934) (emphasis added). See supra notes 25 & 34. But see H.R. REP. No. 85,
73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933).
48. Judge Posner noted that this distinction appeared in A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note
25, before the Securities Acts were passed. 687 F.2d at 201.
49. 687 F.2d at 202.
50. Id. In Golden . Garafalo the Second Circuit in part concluded that the sale of business
doctrine has the potential for creating uncertainty in the applicability of the Securities Acts when
the investment/entrepreneurship distinction has to be resolved. 678 F.2d at 1146. The court pre-
ferred to err on the side of overinclusion rather than underinclusion. Id. Judge Posner, however,
observed that courts are frequently concerned with and capable of line-drawing. 687 F.2d at 202.
This view, however, does not answer the Second Circuit's contention that,
So far as the antifraud policies of the Acts are concerned, the possibilities of fraud and
the ability to protect oneself through contract are the same as to a 'passive' investor
buying 30% of a corporation's shares from a sole shareholder or an 'active' purchaser
taking 100% and expecting to manage it directly. So far as curing the overbreadth of the
Act is concerned, therefore, the relevant distinction is between transactions in a public
market for stock and negotiated transactions involving close corporations, whether or
not they involve transfers of control. ... mhe Act has always been understood to
apply to transactions in shares of close as well as publicly held corporations and to nego-
tiated as well as market sales and purchases of shares.. .. Forman provides us no
reason to reexamine that understanding.
678 F.2d at 1146-47 (citations omitted). See supra note 28.
51. 687 F.2d at 202-03.
52. Id. at 203. See 13 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
§ 5805 (rev. perm. ed. 1980). It is possible in a corporation with many shareholders for the holder
of less than 50% of the outstanding shares to have a controlling interest, for example, through the
use of voting trusts or proxies.
The presence of a controlling interest is not easily detectible in situations which rely on the
implementation of a device or agreement whereby a minority interest effectively acquires control.
The logic of the sale of business doctrine would therefore require a rebuttable presumption that
such interests do not represent control On a showing that the minority, through some device or
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should have the burden of overcoming the presumption that control
indicates an entrepreuneurial purpose rather than an investment
purpose.5
3
The decision in Sutter is the logical culmination of the Seventh Cir-
cuit's attempt to foreclose private rights of action under the anti-fraud
provisions of the Securities Act' by narrowing the scope of federal
subject-matter jurisdiction.55 These decisions rest on a strained inter-
pretation of both Supreme Court precedent and legislative history.5 6
As the statutes are drafted and as they have been interpreted, "stock"
should be accorded its ordinary meaning.57
The investor/entrepreneur dichotomy that the economic reality ap-
proach of Howey and Forman brings into play, however, has a great
deal to commend it.58 As the cases involving acquisitions of corpora-
tions through stock purchases indicate, such purchasers as a rule do not
need the same protection that a stock exchange investor, for example,
needs.59 Furthermore, the federal courts should not be cluttered with
cases brought by plaintiffs to whom the doctrine of caveat emptor
ought to apply.6° Should a revision of the federal securities provisions
agreement, has acquired control the presumption would be rebutted and the Securities Act should
no longer apply. Under the definitions of security as they were drafted, however, neither pre-
sumption is warranted. The definitions do not adopt the concepts of control or investment pur-
pose. Instead, the definitions include "stock" See infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
53. 687 F.2d at 203. The court did not consider whether the sale of business doctrine should
apply to purchases of 50% or less of a corporation's stock.
54. See, tg., 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5 (1982).
55. 687 F.2d at 202. See, eg., Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir.), cer. denied,
101 S. Ct. 3006 (1981); Emisco Indus., Inc. v. Pro's, Inc., 543 F.2d 38 (7th Cir. 1976); supra notes
27-28.
56. See nupra notes 10-27 and accompanying text.
57. See upm note 23.
58. The cases that have applied the sale of business doctrine argue that the Securities Acts
were intended to protect only investors. The legislative history, however, better suits a more
inclusive application under the Acts. See Aupra notes 15 & 38. On the other hand, even the cases
supporting a literal approach recognize that investors comprise the only class that needs a federal
remedy. See, eg., Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139, 146-47 (2d Cir. 1982). An economic reali-
ties criteria would provide the judicial flexibility necessary for distinguishing investors from all
others. See genera/), Thompson, "pm note 7.
59. The typical investor in a NYSE stock acquires a small percentage of the shares in any one
stock and does not have the equality of bargaining power that would be necessary to otherwise get
disclosure from the seller.
60. See McClure v. First Nat'l Bank of Lubbock, Texas, 497 F.2d 490, 495 (5th Cir. 1974).
Cases applying the literal approach argue that, because the statute is there for all to read, when
parties choose to use stock in their transaction they expect the Securities Acts to apply. See, eg.,
Coffin v. Polishing Machs., Inc, 596 F.2d 1202, 1204 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979).
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be forthcoming, therefore, it would be appropriate for Congress to
adopt an economic reality approach in defining security. 1
TKL.
The best argument in support of the sale of business doctrine is that, in effect, the acquisition of a
corporation by a stock purchase is the same as the acquisition of a corporation by an asset
purchase. The stock is merely an indicia of ownership of the underlying assets similar to a deed.
See, e.g., 637 F.2d at 1151-52.
61. Appeals for reform of the federal securities laws have come from many quarters. See,
e.g, ALI FED. SEC. CODE (1980).
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